Hindsight is 20/20 but from the regulatory filings, it was clear there was something wrong with AIG and Bear Sterns. The execs promised they would fix it and there was nothing to worry about which is how they tricked it but I don’t see that kind of worry at all with Toyota.
Now, I don’t claim that I’m paying attention to all the 10-Q and 10-K filings, but it’s interesting to note that they disclosed by law all the issues they were having.
AIG Story:
November 7, 2007: In an SEC filing, AIG reports $352 million in unrealized losses from its credit-default swap portfolio, but says it’s “highly unlikely” AIG would really lose any money on the deals.
December 5, 2007: In an SEC filing, AIG discloses $1.05 billion to $1.15 billion in further unrealized losses to its swaps portfolio, a total of approximately $1.5 billion for 2007.
During a conference call with investors, CEO Martin Sullivan explains that the probability that AIG’s credit-default swap portfolio will sustain an “economic loss” is “close to zero.”
AIG’s risk-modeling system had proven “very reliable,” Sullivan said, and since the transactions were so “conservatively structured,” AIG had “a very high level of comfort” with its risk models.
Federal investigators are probing whether Sullivan and other AIG executives misled investors at this meeting, according to the Wall Street Journal.ebruary 11, 2008: AIG discloses in a regulatory filing that its auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, has found a problem: a “material weakness” in its valuation of the swaps. AIG therefore needed to “clarify and expand” its prior disclosures.
AIG puts the unrealized losses of its swaps portfolio at $5.96 billion through November 2007.